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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
By the last quarter of 2001, Argentina entered into one of the most important 
financial and economic crises of its history. The crisis was characterized by huge bank 
deposit withdrawals, a significant decrease in Central Bank reserves, the abandonment of 
the Argentine peso peg against the dollar, the country’s formal declaration of the largest 
debt default in history, and a GDP decrease of 4.4% in 2001 and 10.9% in 2002. 
Paradoxically, in the middle of this financial and economic collapse, the Argentine stock 
market boomed, shown by an increase in the MERVAL index (local index) of 115% (in 
Argentine pesos) between the end of November 2001 and the end of March 2002. This was 
contrary to what happened in other emerging countries’ financial crises, such as Mexico, 
Malaysia or Korea during the 90’s, whose stock markets declined by roughly 50%. 
At the beginning of December 2001, before the debt default declaration and 
devaluation, extensive restrictions on bank deposit withdrawals and international transfers 
were imposed, in order to stop the severe decline in government reserves and local bank 
deposits, as well as to prevent a speculative attack to the local currency. This group of 
restrictions was named the Corralito. Under the Corralito’s restrictions, it was legal to 
purchase Argentine stocks using frozen bank deposits, including stocks that were cross-
listed in international stock markets.  
This paper analyses the impact of the introduction of capital restrictions as an 
explanation of the stock market boom during this period. In particular, through the stock 
market, investors were able to evade the capital controls and transfer their wealth out of 
Argentina. The mechanism worked as follows: Argentine investors purchased stocks in the 
Buenos Aires Stock Exchange (BCBA – “Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires”) using their 
frozen bank deposits, converted them into American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) in U.S. 
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stock markets, and finally sold the ADRs and deposited the proceeds in the U.S. banking 
system. This paper also compares and analyses the differences of the Corralito’s impact on 
cross-listed stocks (ADR stocks) and non cross-listed stocks (non-ADR stocks).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the Argentine 
crisis and a detailed description of the capital controls introduced by the Corralito. Section 
III analyses the price impact of the Corralito on ADR and non-ADR stocks. Section IV 
qualitatively and quantitatively examines the reasons for the stock price distortions 
generated by the capital controls by decomposing the premium on ADR and non-ADR 
stocks. Finally, Section V analyses how local and global factors that have influence in stock 
pricing changed after the Corralito introduction and during the period in which Argentine 
stock market was closed.  
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II. OVERVIEW OF ARGENTINE CRISIS AND CAPITAL CONTROLS  
 
II.1 Brief History of 2001-2002 Argentine Crisis 
 
The 2001-2002 Argentine crisis was among the most severe of its history. The 
currency-board, under which the Argentine peso had been pegged at parity against the U.S. 
dollar since 1991, collapsed in January 2002, and by the end of March 2002, the Argentine 
peso was trading at 3 pesos per U.S. dollar. The crisis came after three years of economic 
recessions and had a devastating economic and social impact, reflected by the fall in GDP 
of about 20% over a three year period (2000 - 2002), the default of government debt, the 
collapse of the banking system, a deep corporate crisis, social unrest, and violent 
demonstrations against the government. In the following graph, we show the quarterly 
evolution of Argentine GDP and the peso price of the dollar from 1991 to 2002. 
Graph 1: GDP and Exchange Rate Evolution 
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II.2 Description of Capital Controls introduced by the Corralito 
 
 Through the Corralito, the government imposed several restrictions on bank deposit 
withdrawals. In particular, only 250 pesos (250 U.S. dollar at the time it was implemented) 
per week per account could be withdrawn from banks’ accounts and only 1,000 pesos were 
allowed to be taken abroad. An official permit was required to make foreign payments 
above this amount. In addition, all investors were prohibited from transferring funds outside 
the Argentine banking system. The Corralito was established on December 3, 2001, and 
was announced as a temporary measure to stop the significant capital outflows that the 
country was suffering. From July 2001 to November 2001, more than $15 billion was 
withdrawn from Argentina’s banks. In particular, in the three days from November 28 to 
November 30, 2001, $3.6 billion, 6% of total deposits, left the banking system. 
 Under the Corralito, it was allowed to use the frozen bank deposits in excess of the 
250 pesos per week to buy stocks that traded in the Argentine stock market. If the 
purchased stock was also listed in the U.S., it could be converted into an ADR and sold in 
the U.S., depositing the dollar proceeds in the U.S. banking system.  
 
II.3 Stock Market Boom 
 
As we can see in Graph 2, until the introduction of the Corralito, Argentine local 
index, the MERVAL, was decreasing at a significant rate, reflecting the economic 
conditions of the country. From June 1, 2001 to November 30, 2001, the MERVAL 
dropped by 53.5%. However, after the Corralito’s introduction, the Argentine stock market 
increased significantly, even though the Argentine economy was collapsing. In fact, the 
MERVAL increased by 69.5% since the Corralito introduction on December 3, 2001 until 
the beginning of January 2002, just before the currency peg abandonment. In Argentine 
5 
pesos terms, the MERVAL increased by 115% from the Corralito imposition to the end of 
March 2002. 
Graph 2: MERVAL Evolution 
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II.4 Time Line of Important Economic, Financial and Political Events 
  
In order to analyze the impact of the introduction of capital controls on the local 
stock market, it is important to know the time line of the main economic, financial and 
political events during the period December 2001 - March 2002.  
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Table 1: Main Events in Argentine Crisis 
Date Events 
December 3, 2001 The Corralito’s restrictions are imposed. 
 
December 19, 2001 Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo resigns. 
 
December 20, 2001 President Fernando De La Rua resigns. President of the Senate Ramon Puerta 
becomes interim President. Stock market is closed since December 21, 2001. 
 
December 23, 2001 Adolfo Rodríguez Saá is elected President by Legislative Assembly. He 
announces partial suspension of external debt payments. 
 
December 28, 2001 Stock exchange is re-opened after being closed for 7 days. 
 
December 30, 2001 Rodríguez Saá resigns. Head of Lower House Eduardo Camaño becomes 
interim President. 
 
January 1, 2002 Eduardo Duhalde is elected President by the Legislative Assembly. 
 
January 4, 2002 Financial press suggests that devaluation is imminent. Devaluation estimate is 
approximately 40%. 
 
January 6, 2002 The convertibility law (currency board) is abolished by the Congress. A dual 
exchange rate regime is introduced; one fixed at 1.40 pesos per U.S. dollar for 
foreign trade operations, and the other freely determined by the market. 
Financial markets are closed since January 7, 2002. 
 
January 11, 2002 The exchange rate market is re-opened and the new exchange rate regime is 
implemented. 
 
January 17, 2002 Stock exchange is re-opened after being closed for 10 days. 
 
February 3, 2002 U.S. dollar deposits are “pesoized”1 at 1.4 pesos per U.S. dollar. The dual 
exchange regimes established in January 6 are unified in a floating exchange 
rate regime.  
 
March 25, 2002 ADRs conversion restrictions are announced with the objective of regulating 
capital outflows through ADRs. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Mandatory conversion of dollar-denominated deposits to pesos-denominated deposits at 1.4 pesos per dollar 
rather than at the prevailing market exchange rate. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF IMPACT OF CAPITAL CONTROLS ON LOCAL STOCK 
MARKET  
 
III.1 Description of Data 
 
 In order to analyze the impact of the introduction of capital controls on stock prices, 
we separated Argentine stocks in two groups: 
 Stocks traded in the local stock market and cross-listed in U.S. stock markets, and 
 Stocks only traded in the local stock market. 
As at December 2001, 25 Argentine firms were cross-listed in U.S. stock markets: 
11 in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 3 in the NASDAQ and 11 were private 
placements only available to institutional investors. 
Based on these groups of stocks, we created three portfolios: 
 ADR Stock Portfolio: Equally weighted portfolio denominated in U.S. dollar and 
composed by the following 11 stocks that traded in the BCBA and were cross-listed 
in the NYSE. 
Table 2: Stocks included in ADR Stock Portfolio 
BBVA Banco Frances 
Cresud 
Grupo Galicia 
IRSA 
Metrogas 
Petrobras 
Siderca 
Telecom Argentina 
Telefonica Argentina 
Transportadora Gas del Sur 
YPF 
 
 ADR Portfolio: Equally weighted portfolio denominated in U.S. dollar and 
composed by ADRs representing the cross-listed stocks included in the ADR stock 
portfolio. To be comparable with the other portfolios, ADR prices were converted to 
8 
a per share basis by dividing the ADR price by the number of Argentine shares that 
the ADR represented.  
 Non-ADR Stock Portfolio: Equally weighted portfolio denominated in U.S. dollar 
and composed of the 28 most traded stocks in the BCBA, excluding cross-listed 
stocks. The following firms were included in the portfolio.  
Table 3: Stocks included in Non-ADR Stock Portfolio 
Acindar Industria Argentina de Aceros SA 
Agrometal 
Aluar 
Atanor SA 
Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires 
Banco Hipotecario SA 
Banco Macro Bansud SA 
Boldt 
Carlos Casado SA 
Celulosa Argentina 
Central Puerto SA 
Cynba 
Dycasa SA 
Gas Natural BAN (Argentina) 
Grupo Consorcio del Oeste 
Hipotecario 
Juan Minetti SA 
Ledesma SA 
Longvie 
Molinos Rio de la Plata 
Polledo SA 
Quickfood SA 
Renault Argentina 
SA Importadora y Exportadora Patagonia 
San Miguel 
Sociedad Comercial del Plata SA 
Solvay Indupa SAIC 
Transener SA 
Acindar Industria Argentina de Aceros SA 
 
Local stock prices were converted to U.S. dollars using the dollar/peso spot 
exchange rate at the close of each day. 
 
III.2 Evolution of Cross-Listed Stock Prices  
 
In the following graph, we show the price evolution of the ADR stock portfolio and 
the ADR portfolio between October 2001 and May 2002. Note that in order to compare 
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local stock prices with ADR prices, ADRs were converted to the number of underlying 
shares using the ADR conversion factor. Transaction costs of ADR conversions were 
ignored.  
Graph 3: ADR Stock Portfolio and ADR Portfolio 
(at the Corralito imposition on 11/30/01 = 100)  
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 Source: DataStream 
 
As we can see from the graph, before the introduction of the Corralito, the gap 
between local share prices and ADR prices was minimal and may be explained by 
transaction costs. The weighted average deviation between local share prices and ADR 
prices was 0.16% during the period from June 1, 2001 to November 30, 2001 (see Table 4). 
The fact that ADRs and their underlying securities moved together is in line with finance 
literature that suggests that the law of one price hold for cross-listed stocks after adjusting 
for exchange rate differences and transaction costs, leading to no arbitrage opportunities.  
However, after the Corralito introduction in December 2001, the deviation between 
local share prices and ADR prices increased significantly. While ADR prices were stable, 
local share prices were increasing at an astonishing rate. This gap between the local shares 
and the ADRs represented the premium that investors were willing to pay to transfer their 
10 
wealth from their frozen bank deposits in Argentina into the U.S. financial system, and 
explained the violation of the law of one price. The premium reached a peak of over 40% 
just before the peso peg abandonment in January 2002, implying the significant premium 
that investors were willing to pay to avoid losses in their frozen peso-denominated deposits 
that a potential devaluation would cause. Table 4 shows that for 7 of the 11 stocks analyzed 
in this portfolio, their maximum premium was reached on January 3 or January 4, 2002, 
days before the currency peg collapse, implying that a significant component of the 
premium was due to investors’ expectations of an imminent devaluation. After Argentine’s 
devaluation, the premium, though significant, decreased to lower levels and it tended to 
disappear, by the end of March 2002, after the announcement of certain restrictions that 
diminished Argentine investors’ incentives to continue using the ADR vehicle. 
In Exhibit 1, we show the evolution of the ADR premium for the two most liquid 
cross-listed stocks: Telecom Argentina and Petrobras. 
In the following table, we show the average premium of the local shares over the 
ADRs for the 11 stocks and ADRs included in the ADR stock portfolio and ADR portfolio. 
Note that days where the BCBA was closed (December 21 – December 27, 2002 and 
January 7 – January 16, 2002) were excluded from the calculation. 
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Table 4: Premium per ADR Stock23 
 
Pre-Corralito Post-Corralito and Pre-Devaluation Post-Devaluation Post-ADR Restriction
6/1/01 - 11/30/01 12/3/01 - 1/10/02 1/11/02 - 3/25/02 3/26/02 - 5/31/02
Average Peak Average Peak Peak Day Average Peak Average Peak
BBVA Banco Frances -8.62% -2.52% 16.03% 48.29% 1/21/2002 6.79% 64.79% -3.05% 9.95%
Cresud 0.77% 4.44% 8.58% 40.50% 1/4/2002 10.74% 38.98% 3.49% 13.11%
Grupo Galicia -4.27% 2.60% 24.32% 61.07% 1/21/2002 8.10% 85.37% -2.43% 11.11%
Irsa 2.13% 5.71% 19.54% 37.99% 1/3/2002 13.37% 28.60% 4.40% 13.34%
Metrogas -2.67% 4.00% 5.19% 33.33% 12/20/2001 7.62% 28.27% -1.07% 26.32%
Petrobras 0.14% 5.56% 28.49% 76.68% 1/4/2002 14.25% 39.80% 6.12% 15.87%
Siderca 0.07% 4.12% 30.54% 66.88% 1/3/2002 14.74% 33.81% 5.51% 14.57%
Telecom Argentina 0.19% 7.10% 26.97% 53.38% 1/4/2002 13.27% 36.90% 4.64% 16.67%
Telefonica Argentina -0.46% 21.11% 17.27% 30.75% 1/29/2002 11.27% 32.71% -8.24% 14.29%
Transportadora Gas Sur -0.02% 7.22% 26.88% 57.79% 1/4/2002 12.11% 28.99% 0.88% 12.90%
YPF 1.61% 11.80% 19.16% 46.60% 1/4/2002 17.76% 43.55% 11.48% 33.29%
Average -1.01% 20.27% 11.82% 1.98%
Weigthed Average 0.16% 21.62% 14.39% 4.53%  
 
Source: DataStream 
 
 
III.3 Evolution of Non Cross-Listed Stock Prices 
 
  Although local stocks that were not cross-listed in U.S. stock markets did not 
represent, for Argentine investors, a vehicle to shift their wealth from Argentina to the U.S., 
they represented a better investment option than investors’ current status quo of 
maintaining their frozen bank deposits. In particular, Argentine stocks were more liquid 
than Argentine bank deposits and were a better hedge alternative against a potential 
devaluation or “pesoization” of bank deposits.  
 In the following graph, we show the price evolution of the non-ADR stock portfolio 
compared with the price evolution of the ADR stock portfolio between October 2001 and 
May 2002. Note that a comparison between these two portfolios is meaningful as they are 
very strongly positive correlated. In particular, before the Corralito the correlation between 
the non-ADR stock portfolio and the ADR stock portfolio was 0.994, while after the 
Corralito introduction it slightly declined to 0.947. 
                                                 
2 Premium was calculated as (Stock Price – ADR Price) / ADR Price and was not adjusted for transaction 
costs. ADR Price was calculated on a per share basis using the ADR conversion factor. 
3 Weighted average based on market capitalization. 
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Graph 4: ADR Stock Portfolio and Non-ADR Stock Portfolio  
(at the Corralito imposition on 11/30/01 = 100) 
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 As in the case of the ADR stock portfolio, the non-ADR stock portfolio reached a 
peak during the days before of the currency peg collapse, showing the significant impact of 
expectations of devaluation on the premium of non-cross listed stocks. However, the 
increase in stock prices was not as high as in the case of cross-listed stocks. 
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IV. DECOMPOSITION OF STOCK PREMIUM 
 
IV.1 Estimated Composition of ADR Stock Premium 
 
Under an efficient market, the price of local stocks reflects the fundamental value of 
the firms, and is the main factor that determines the price of ADRs. However, in the 
presence of capital controls, such as the Corralito, local stock prices were distorted as local 
stocks represented a vehicle for Argentine investors to move their deposits out of 
Argentina. As the Corralito only affected Argentine investors, and not foreign investors, 
ADR prices were not distorted and, under this scenario, could be considered a close 
estimate of the fundamental value of the stocks. 
Under the hypothesis that ADRs reflected the fundamental price of the stock, the 
deviation between local share prices and ADR prices should represent the premium that 
Argentine investors were willing to pay to: 
 Convert its frozen deposits, that could be partially or totally lost in value (by a 
potential reprogramming of deposits or bankruptcy of the financial institution), into 
liquid stocks (liquidity premium), 
 Transfer wealth from Argentina to the U.S. (control capital avoidance premium), 
and 
 Convert its peso-denominated deposits (or U.S. dollar-denominated deposits), 
which had a high probability of losing value through the local currency devaluation 
(or a significant threat of “pesoization”), into U.S. dollar-denominated securities or 
deposits in the U.S. banking system (exchange rate hedge premium). 
As analyzed in Section III, the expectation of the abandonment of the currency peg 
was key in explaining the ADR stock and non-ADR stock price peak by the beginning of 
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January 2002, just before the exchange rate collapse. In order to estimate investors’ 
devaluation expectations, we calculated the daily-expected devaluation rate as the 
percentage difference between the spot exchange rate and the one-week non-deliverable 
forward (NDF) exchange rate (mid bid-ask).  
In order to estimate the average premiums previously described, we regressed the 
value of the ADR stock portfolio (SA) against the value of the ADR portfolio (A), the 
expected devaluation rate (D) and two dummy variables (0 or 1) according to whether the 
data analyzed was before or after the Corralito imposition (X1), and before or after the ADR 
restriction announcement (X2):  
SA = β 0 + β 1 A + β 2 D + β 3 X1 + β 4 X2 +ε  
While β 2 should reflect the impact of a D percent expected devaluation on the 
value of the ADR stock portfolio (exchange rate hedge coefficient), β 3  should represent 
the liquidity and control capital avoidance premium created by the Corralito, and β 4  the 
control capital avoidance premium that should have disappeared when ADR conversions 
were restricted. This analysis assumes that the exchange rate hedge coefficient, and the 
liquidity and control capital avoidance premium are constant during the period. Under this 
assumption, we can estimate the individual premiums: 
Exchange Rate Hedge Premium = β 2 D 
Control Capital Avoidance Premium = -β 4 
Liquidity Premium = β 3 + β 4 
The period regressed was from June 1, 2001 to May 31, 2002, excluding the days in 
which the local stock market was closed (13 business days). The following regression was 
obtained (see Exhibit 2 for regression details): 
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SA = - 0.49 + 0.98 A + 0.87 D + 7.15 X1 - 5.68 X2 +ε     (R2 = 99.4%) 
 Based on the above regression, the control capital avoidance and liquidity premium 
imbedded in the ADR premium were 5.68% and 1.47% respectively. The estimated 
exchange rate hedge coefficient was 0.87, which implies that an expected devaluation of 
the Argentine peso of 1% generated a 0.87% increase in the ADR stock portfolio value. In 
the following graph, we show the evolution of the ADR premium based on its three 
components compared with the observed premium caused by the Corralito introduction.  
Graph 5: Estimated Premiums for ADR Stock Portfolio  
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 Our assumption of constant premiums over the period is an explanatory reason for 
certain deviations between the sum of our estimated premiums and the observed premium. 
In particular, the exchange rate hedge coefficient should be higher before the “pesoization” 
of U.S. dollars bank deposits in February 2002, and in particular previous the currency peg 
collapse. In fact, the exchange rate coefficient was β 2 = 1.11 before the peso-peg 
abandonment and β 2 = 0.64 after it. Moreover, even though the ADR conversion 
restrictions were announced by late March 2002, the easing of bank withdrawals 
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restrictions in February and March 2002 should have lowered the control capital avoidance 
and liquidity premium, partially explaining the gap between the sum of our estimated 
premiums and the total observed premium during this period. 
 
IV.2 Estimated Composition of Non-ADR Stock Premium 
 
While by buying non-cross listed stocks, investors were not able to transfer their 
wealth from Argentina to the U.S. (control avoidance premium), local shares, in theory, 
provided higher liquidity than frozen bank deposits and a partial hedge against the 
exchange rate risk. We have to note that even though stock prices in the BCBA are 
denominated in Argentine pesos, investors would be willing to pay a partial exchange rate 
hedge premium considering that part of the firms’ cash flows are in foreign currencies.  
In order to estimate the average liquidity and exchange rate hedge premiums, the 
value of the non-ADR stock portfolio (SN) was regressed against the value of the ADR 
portfolio (A), the expected devaluation rate (D), and a dummy variable (0 or 1) according to 
whether the data analyzed was before or after the Corralito imposition (X1): 
SN = β 0 + β 1 A + β 2 D + β 3 X1 +ε  
This analysis also assumes that the exchange rate hedge coefficient and the liquidity 
premium are constant during the period, and therefore: 
Exchange Rate Hedge Premium = β 2 D 
Liquidity Premium = β 3 
The period regressed was from June 1, 2001 to May 31, 2002, excluding the days in 
which the local stock market was closed. The following regression was obtained (see 
Exhibit 3 for regression details):  
SN = 29.6 + 0.73 A + 0.52 D – 0.19 X1 +ε     (R2 = 98.4%) 
17 
 The exchange rate hedge coefficient obtained for the non-ADR stock portfolio is 
0.52, implying a 0.52% increase in the price of non-ADR stocks for every 1% of 
devaluation expected. This is lower than the coefficient obtained for the ADR stock 
portfolio, but it is reasonable considering that non-cross listed stocks did not completely 
eliminated the exchange rate risk, but only partially mitigated it. The results from the 
regression imply that the capital controls did not introduce a liquidity premium on non-
cross listed stocks, as its coefficient (β 3) is close to 0 and is not statistically significant. 
Cross-listed stocks are naturally more liquid than non-cross listed stocks (one of the main 
reasons for issuing ADRs in international markets is to increase the stock’s liquidity), and 
investors may have been willing to pay a premium only for the extra liquidity offered by 
stocks with ADRs traded in the U.S. Therefore, Argentine investors were disposed to 
purchase non-cross listed stocks only to have a partial hedge against the devaluation, but 
they were not willing to pay an additional premium for the extra liquidity that these stocks 
may offer compared to investors’ frozen bank deposits. 
 Selling pressures after the acquisition of non-cross listed stocks may partially 
explain the lower price increase in this group of shares. Investors that used their frozen 
bank deposits to purchase these stocks may have sold the shares acquired if they were able 
to move the peso proceeds out of the financial system and convert them into U.S. dollars in 
the exchange rate black market. This issue was not quantified in this analysis, and would 
require further investigation. 
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V. ADR MARKET PRICING CHANGES INTRODUCED BY CAPITAL 
CONTROLS  
 
In Section III and Section IV, we showed the pricing distortions in local shares 
resulting from the introduction of capital controls. In this section we analyze whether or not 
the Corralito caused significant changes in the pricing of ADRs, particularly during the 
days in which the underlying securities were not trading, as the local stock market was 
closed. 
We regressed the ADR portfolio returns (RA) against a local index returns 
(MERVAL in U.S. dollar - RM) and an international index returns (S&P500 - RS&P) before 
and after the Corralito introduction (June 1, 2001 – November 30, 2001 and December 3, 
2001 – May 31, 2002, excluding the periods in which BCBA was closed): 
RA = β 0 + β 1 RS&P + β 2 RM + ε  
We also analyzed the ADRs pricing during the two periods in which the underlying 
local stock market was closed, but the ADRs were trading in the NYSE: December 21 – 
December 27, 2001, and January 7 - January 16, 2002: 
RA = β 0 + β 1 RS&P + ε  
In the following table we show the results from the regressions (see exhibits 4, 5 
and 6 for regression details): 
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Table 5: ADR Pricing Regression Results  
 
 Pre-Corralito Post-Corralito BCBA Closed 
    
β 1 0.230 0.406 0.824 
β 2 0.622 0.098 N.A. 
    
SE β 1 0.091 0.246 0.751 
SE β 2 0.038 0.043 N.A. 
    
t-stat β 1 2.530 1.650 1.100 
t-stat β 2 16.380 2.300 N.A. 
    
R2 70.60% 10.70% 9.90% 
 
N.A. : Not Applicable 
 
The results suggest that the Corralito introduction made the ADR portfolio more 
dependent on the international market than the local market, which reflected a premium 
over the fundamental value of the stocks. In fact, the beta on the local market portfolio 
decreased from 0.62 before the Corralito to 0.10 during the Corralito. On the other hand, 
the ADR portfolio was more affected by international market conditions during the 
Corralito, as the beta on the international market portfolio increased from 0.23 before the 
Corralito to 0.41 during the Corralito. This is reasonable, as the Corralito’s restrictions only 
affected Argentine investors, and not investors in the U.S. Argentine investors’ incentives 
to invest in their local stock market were not in line with the market conditions that foreign 
investors were facing in the U.S. stock markets, where the ADRs trade. It is important to 
mention that while the local and international indexes explained more than 70% of the 
variance of the ADR portfolio returns before the Corralito, they only explained 11% of the 
variance of the ADR portfolio returns during the Corralito. 
During the period in which the underlying local stock market was closed (13 
business days), the ADR portfolio correlation with the international market increased 
20 
significantly. In particular, the beta on the international market portfolio increased to 0.82. 
It is important to consider that the regression is based on only 13 data points, that the t-
statistic of the coefficient was not statistically significant and that the international index 
explained only roughly 10% of the variance of the ADR portfolio returns. 
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VI. SUMMARY 
 
 The introduction of capital controls in the middle of the Argentine crisis created a 
significant distortion in both cross-listed and non cross-listed local stock prices. Argentine 
investors used the local stock market to escape the capital controls imposed by the 
Corralito. In particular, by purchasing ADR stocks, converting them into ADRs and selling 
them in U.S. stock markets, Argentine investors were able to transfer their wealth from 
their frozen bank deposits in Argentina to the U.S. banking system. By doing so they were 
not only able to avoid the local capital controls, but to completely eliminate the devaluation 
risk that the Argentine peso was suffering, while increasing the liquidity of their 
investment. For these reasons, Argentine investors were willing to pay a significant 
premium for the local stocks, assuming an instant loss when they converted the stocks into 
ADRs that trade in the U.S. This premium varied during the period December 2001 – 
March 2002 according to the significance of the control capital, devaluation and liquidity 
risks, reaching a peak of over 40% just before the currency peg abandonment at the 
beginning of January 2002. 
 Even though their increase was lower than the one observed in ADR stock prices, 
non-ADR stock prices were also significantly impacted by the Corralito. While local stocks 
that were not cross-listed did not represent a vehicle for Argentine investors to transfer their 
funds abroad, they represented a partial hedge for a potential devaluation. According to our 
estimates, Argentine investors were willing to pay an average premium of 0.87% per every 
1% expected devaluation for ADR stocks, but only an average premium of 0.52% per every 
1% expected devaluation for non-ADR stocks during the analyzed period. Our analysis 
shows that, even though non cross-listed stocks should have higher liquidity than frozen 
bank deposits, Argentine investors were not disposed to pay a premium for this concept 
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when buying these stocks. However, as stocks that are cross-listed have a significant higher 
liquidity, an average liquidity premium of approximately 1.50% was attached to these 
stocks during the analyzed period. Finally, according to our calculations, an average capital 
control avoidance premium of approximately 5.70% was paid by Argentine investors when 
buying cross-listed stocks during the analyzed period. 
 The introduction of the Corralito not only distorted local stock prices, but also 
produced changes in the pricing of Argentine ADRs traded in the U.S. While before the 
Corralito, most of the variation on the returns of Argentine ADRs was explained by the 
Argentine stock market, after the introduction of capital controls, local conditions explained 
very little the changes in ADR returns. On the contrary, during this period, the correlation 
of Argentine ADR returns with the international market increased. This trend was even 
more significant during the period in which the local stock market was closed. 
 Some of these features result from the specific policies adopted in Argentina, but 
others may reflect the general distortions that follow from capital controls. In part, they 
produce sharp differences between local and international prices of capital, and potentially 
distort the allocation of capital internally. These costs would need to be considered when 
evaluating the overall impact of capital controls on the economy. 
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EXHIBIT 1 – PREMIUM FOR TELECOM ARGENTINA AND PETROBRAS4 
ADR-Stock Premium - Telecom Argentina
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Source: DataStream
                                                 
4 Premium was calculated as (Stock Price - ADR Price) / ADR Price and was not adjusted for transaction 
costs. ADR Price was calculated on a per share basis using the ADR conversion factor. 
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EXHIBIT 2 – REGRESSION ADR STOCK PORTFOLIO PREMIUM 
 
 
ADR Stock Portfolio = - 0.49 + 0.985 ADR Portfolio + 7.15 Corralito 
                      - 5.68 ADR Restriction Announcement 
                      + 0.867 Exp Devaluation (%) 
 
 
Predictor                         Coef   SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                        -0.489     1.231   -0.40  0.692 
ADR Portfolio                 0.984883  0.007846  125.52  0.000 
Corralito                       7.1546    0.8406    8.51  0.000 
ADR Restriction Announcement   -5.6794    0.7623   -7.45  0.000 
Exp Devaluation (%)            0.86702   0.04183   20.73  0.000 
 
 
S = 3.57796   R-Sq = 99.4%   R-Sq(adj) = 99.4% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source           DF      SS      MS        F      P 
Regression        4  487994  121999  9529.77  0.000 
Residual Error  243    3111      13 
Total           247  491105
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EXHIBIT 3 – REGRESSION NON-ADR STOCK PORTFOLIO PREMIUM 
 
 
Non-ADR Stock Portfolio = 29.6 + 0.730 ADR Portfolio - 0.193 Corralito 
                          + 0.523 Exp Devaluation (%) 
 
 
Predictor                Coef   SE Coef      T      P 
Constant               29.608     1.476  20.06  0.000 
ADR Portfolio        0.730231  0.009388  77.78  0.000 
Corralito             -0.1932    0.9804  -0.20  0.844 
Exp Devaluation (%)   0.52301   0.04780  10.94  0.000 
 
 
S = 4.42478   R-Sq = 98.4%   R-Sq(adj) = 98.3% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source           DF      SS     MS        F      P 
Regression        3  285493  95164  4860.61  0.000 
Residual Error  244    4777     20 
Total           247  290270 
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EXHIBIT 4 – REGRESSION PRE-CORRALITO ADR RETURNS 
 
 
ADR Portfolio Return = - 0.00212 + 0.230 S&P500 Return + 0.622 MERVAL Return 
 
Predictor           Coef   SE Coef      T      P 
Constant       -0.002121  0.001100  -1.93  0.056 
S&P500 Return    0.22977   0.09087   2.53  0.013 
MERVAL Return    0.62169   0.03795  16.38  0.000 
 
 
S = 0.0123221   R-Sq = 70.6%   R-Sq(adj) = 70.2% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source           DF        SS        MS       F      P 
Regression        2  0.046412  0.023206  152.84  0.000 
Residual Error  127  0.019283  0.000152 
Total           129  0.065695 
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EXHIBIT 5 – REGRESSION POST-CORRALITO ADR RETURNS 
 
 
ADR Portfolio Return = - 0.00306 + 0.406 S&P500 Return + 0.0983 MERVAL Return 
 
 
Predictor           Coef   SE Coef      T      P 
Constant       -0.003063  0.002582  -1.19  0.240 
S&P500 Return     0.4063    0.2461   1.65  0.103 
MERVAL Return    0.09832   0.04281   2.30  0.025 
 
 
S = 0.0216564   R-Sq = 10.7%   R-Sq(adj) = 8.1% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF         SS         MS     F      P 
Regression       2  0.0038367  0.0019184  4.09  0.021 
Residual Error  68  0.0318918  0.0004690 
Total           70  0.0357286 
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EXHIBIT 6 – REGRESSION ADR RETURNS WHEN UNDERLYING STOCK 
MARKET WAS CLOSED 
 
 
ADR Portfolio Return = - 0.00745 + 0.824 S&P500 Return 
 
 
Predictor           Coef   SE Coef      T      P 
Constant       -0.007454  0.005102  -1.46  0.172 
S&P500 Return     0.8237    0.7505   1.10  0.296 
 
 
S = 0.0177143   R-Sq = 9.9%   R-Sq(adj) = 1.7% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF         SS         MS     F      P 
Regression       1  0.0003780  0.0003780  1.20  0.296 
Residual Error  11  0.0034517  0.0003138 
Total           12  0.0038298 
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